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MAY-JUNE, 1958
CASE COMMENTS
Criminal Law-Driving While Intoxicated-
Farm Tractor Held Vehicle
By E. R. ARCHAMBEAU, JR.
E. R. Archambeau, Jr. is a registered professional engineer who received his B.S.
degree from Texas Technological College in 1949 and his M.S. from the Univer-
sity of Illinois in 1950. At present, he is a student in the University of Denver
College of Law.
The defendant was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting oper-
ation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated person.' Appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court of Missouri on the ground that the farm tractor
he was driving was not a "motor vehicle" within the purview of the
statute. Attorneys for the appellant urged that a farm tractor was not
a motor vehicle since tractors were exempted from statutes dealing with
registration requirements and motor vehicle safety responsibility regula-
tions. The court rejected this argument because, while those statutes
specifically exempted tractors, the statutes further specified tractors must
comlply with all other vehicular regulations. The court stated that it
was obviously the intent of the legislature that tractors should be gener-
ally classified as motor vehicles. If tractors are not motor vehicles, why
should it be necessary to exclude them specifically from some regulations
concerned only with motor vehicles? It was held that a farm tractor is a
notor vehicle within the meaning of the "driving while intoxicated"
statute. State v. Powell, 306 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1957).
All states expressly prohibit intoxicated persons from driving either
a "motor vehicle" or else a "vehicle." Superficially, it seems obvious just
what a "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" is. But as simple and straightfor-
ward as these terms appear to be, they have been the subject of much
litigation. Generally the difficulties in interpreting these terms arise
in negligence and damage suits. A large number of contract and tax-
ation claims also have involved the definition of these terms. Just
where has the line been drawn?
Motorcycles have been a popular subject of definition since their in-
vention. In many suits involving insurance claims, it has been held
that a motorcycle is neither an automobile,- nor a motor-driven car,'
nor a horse-drawn vehicle.' Likewise, a motorcycle with a sidecar is
neither an automobile nor a motor-driven car.' Two contrary decisions,
one with a dissenting opinion, ruled that the indefinite terms of an acci-
dent policy would be interpreted in favor of the insured and that a
I Mo. Rev. Stat, § 564.440 (Vernon 1949).
2 Neighbors v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 Ark. 356, 31 S.W.2d 418 (1930); La Porte
v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., 161 La. 933, 109 So. 767 (1926); Salo v. North Ameri-
can Ace. Ins. Co., 257 Mass. 303, 153 N.E. 557 (1926); Moore v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 162
Tenn. 682, 40 S.W.2d 403 (1931).
3 Perry v. North American Ace. Ins. Co.. 104 N.J.L. 117, 138 Atil. 894 (1927); Ander-
son v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 197 N.C. 72, 147 S.E. 693, 695 (i929); Deardorff v. Conti-
nental Life Ins. Co., 301 Pa. 179, 151 At. 814 (1930).
4 Perry v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., supra note 3.
M5Landwehr v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Md. 207, 150 Atl. 732, 735 (1930);
lonald v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Tenn. 418. 79 S.W.2d 555 (1935). Contra, Burrus
v. Continental Life Ins. Co.. 225 Mo. App. 1129, 40 S.W.2d 493 (1930).
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motorcycle was considered to be in the same category as automobiles
and motor-driven cars.' An early case, in which a motorcycle operator
was charged with frightening a team of horses, also held that a motor-
cycle was to be considered a motor vehicle."
Animal-drawn devices, such as a horse-drawn road grader,' a mow-
ing machine,' and a threshing machine," have been held to be vehicles.
However, a wagon pulled by a dog is not a vehicle." A horse-drawn
wagon is not a motor vehicle," but is subject to inclusion in statutes
prohibiting driving while intoxicated." A saddle horse, which the in-
sured was riding," and a mule unattached to a conveyance" were found
not to be vehicles. However, it has been decided that horses are vehicles
within the meaning of a statute requiring vehicles on highways to carry
lights after dark." Two similar cases concerning accidents involving
policemen's horses decided that a horse is not a vehicle," but was a
"facility of transportation.""
Motor vehicle statutes generally exclude human-powered devices
from the scope of their regulation. Bicycles have been frequent subjects
of controversy. They have been held not to be motor vehicles by impli-
cation," and specifically." Even though it has been settled for many
years that a bicycle is a vehicle," at least two cases have ruled that a per-
son pushing a bicycle still has the rights of a pedestrian."
In accord with this, it has been decided that two-wheeled cartspushed by a person," a boy's scooter,' sleds," and coaster wagons" are
not subject to motor vehicle regulations. However, in a town where the
local ordinances defined vehicles as including every mobile device ex-
cept baby carriages and street cars, a boy's coaster wagon was thought to
be subject to vehicle regulations." Another case decided that although
6 Womack v. Life & Cas. Co., 184 So. 357 (La. Ct. App. 1938). It was held that
an enclosed motorcycle with a driver's cab and a storage compartment was a 'motor
truck' because it was used to make deliveries. Bolt v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 156 S.C.
117, 152 S.E. 766, 770-71 (1930) (one judge dissented).
7 Bonds v. State, 16 Ga. App. 401, 85 S.D. 629, 631 (1915).
8 Sant v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 49 Idaho 691, 291 Pac. 1072, 1074 (1930). The
court held that a horse-drawn road grader was a vehicle since the deceased was riding
on it to work, but did not pass on the status of such a grader in operation.
9 Trussell v. Ferguson, 122 Neb. 82, 239 N.W. 461, 463 (1931).
10 Vincent v. Taylor Bros., 180 App. Div. 818, 168 N.Y. Supp. 287 (3d Dep't 1917).
11 Jackson v. Hammersley, 72 Idaho 301, 240 P.2d 829, 832 (1952).
12 Bandos v. Philadelphia, 304 Pa. 191, 155 Atl. 279 (1931).
13 State v. Stewart, 57 Ariz. 82, 111 P.2d 70, 71 (1941).
14 Riser v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 207 Iowa 1101, 224 N.W. 67 (1929).
15 State ex rel. Almon v. One Black Horse Mule, 207 Ala. 277, 92 So. 548 (1922).
16 Conrad v. Dillinger, 176 Kan. 296, 270 P.2d 216, 218 (1954).
17 Douglass v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 717, 41 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1st Dep't 1943).
's Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
19 Bank for Savings & Trusts v. United States Cas. Co., 242 Ala. 161, 5 So. 2d 618
(1942).
20 Niedzinski v. Coryell, 215 Mich. 498, 184 N.W. 476 (1921); Taylor v. United Trac-
tion Co., 184 Pa. 465, 40 Atl. 159 (1898).
21 Molway v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 486, 88 N.E. 485 (1909); Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind.
450, 20 N.E. 132, 134 (1889); Thomas v. Dahi, 293 Ky. 808, 170 S.W.2d 337, 338 (1943);
Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, 60 N.W. 545 (1894); Thompson v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 357 Pa. 3, 53 A.2d 120 (1947); State v. Collins, 16 R.I. 371, 17 At]. 131
(1888).
22 Holmes v. Blue Bird Cab, 227 N.C 581, 43 S.E.2d 71 (1947); Benson v. Anderson,
129 Wash. 19, 223 Pac. 1063 ('1924).
23 Gallardo v. Luke, 33 Cal. App. 2d 230, 91 P.2d 211 (1939); People v. Weinberger,
165 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1957); Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 47 S.E.2d 484
(1948); Flaumer v. Samuels, 4 Wash. 2d 609, P.2d 484 (1940).
24 Jermane v. Forfar, 108 Cal. App. 2d 849, 240 P.2d 351, 354 (1952).
25 Illingworth v. Madden, 125 Me. 159, 192 AtI. 273, 276 (1937); Idell v. Day, 273 Pa.
34, ,116 Atl. 506, 507 (1922). Contra, Long v. Hicks, 173 Wash. 17, 21 P.2d 281 (1933)
(statute included sleds in definition of vehicles).
26 Wright v. Salzberger & Sons, 81 Cal. App. 690. 254 Pac. 671, 676 (1927).
27 Hattie v. Shaheen, 37 Ohio App. 50, 174 N.B. 20 (1930); cf. Spears Dairy v.
Bohrer, 54 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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a horse-drawn sleigh was subject to vehicle regulations, a coaster sled
was not.'
Miscellaneous items considered not to be vehicles include ferry boats,"
wheel chairs,"0 and elevators. 1 A potato digger towed by a tractor is
an "implement of husbandry" and not a vehicle." It was decided that
a front-end loader was not a vehicle and therefore was not subject to at-
tachment of a mechanics' lien." However, a motorized carry-all for haul-
ing dirt was a vehicle and subject to vehicular registration require-
ments.' Towed pavement finishers are not subject to vehicle regula-
tions," but motorized road graders' and fork-lift trucks "' are motor
vehicles.
A novel case, in which the plaintiff's deceased husband was shot
while walking down the street, held that a pistol bullet, though moved
or carried by compressed gases, was not a vehicle as considered by an
insurance policy covering accidental death caused by any vehicle."
It has been decided that airplanes are not motor vehicles under the
guest statute,3" automobile accident policies," the National Motor Ve-
hicle Theft Act,'" negligence cases,'" or statutes requiring the recording
of chattel mortgages on all items except vehicles.'" However, an air-
plane is a motor vehicle within the Tariff Act of 1930" and the Missis-
sippi Motor Carrier Regulatory Act of 1938."
Trolley busses," street cars," and trains" are usually held not to
be motor vehicles either because they are not self-powered or because
they run on fixed rails or tracks. Apparently trailers occupy an uncer-
tain status. Some have been considered motor vehicles when connected
to a towing vehicle," but some trailers have been held not to be motor
vehicles even when towed."
Tractors have had their day in court before the instant case. In
insurance claim suits, it has been decided that a farm tractor was not
28 Terrill v. Virginia Brewing Co., 130 Minn. 46, 153 N.W. 136 (1915).
29 Duckwall v. City of New Albany, 25 Ind. 283, 286 (1865).
30 Stevenson v. United States Express Co., 221 Pa. 59, 70 AtI. 275 (1908).
31 Wilson v. C. Dorflinger & Sons, 218 N.Y. 84, 112 N.E. 567 (Ct. App. 1916).
32 Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P.2d 608, 613 (1955).
33 Wilson v. Robert A. Stretch, Inc., 44 N.J. Super. 52, 129 A.2d 599, 603 (1957).
34 People v. Pakchoian, 114 Cal. App. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 767 (1952).
35 Fitzpatrick v. Service Const- Co., 227 Mo. App. 1074, 56 S.W.2d 822, 824 (1933).
36 Peterson v. King County, 199 Wash. 106, 90 P.2d 729 (1939).
37 National Gas. Co. v. Thompson, 96 So. 2d 708 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957).
3' Scott v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 1S So. 2d 58 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
39 In re Hayden's Estate, 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813, 817 (1953); Hanson v. Lewis,
5 Ohio Supp. 195, 1938 U.S. Av. R. 73 (1937).
40 Monroe's Adm'r. v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570, 65 S.W.2d 680, 682
(1933).
41 MeBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
42 Rich v. Finley, 325 Mass. 99, 89 N.E.2d 213, 218 (1949).
43 DiGuilio v. Rice, 27 Cal. App. 2d, 70 P.2d 717 (1937).
'4 United States v. One Pitcairn Biplane, 11 F. Supp. 24 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
45 South Mississippi Airways v. Chicago & Southern Airlines, 200 Miss. 329, 26 So.
2d 455, 461 (1946).
46 City of Dayton v. De Brosse, 62 Ohio App. 232, 23 N.E. 2nd 647, 650 (1939).
47 Chicago v. Keogh, 291 Ill. 188, 125 N.E. 881 (1919).
48 Grover v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 515, 186 P.2d 682,
685 (1947).
49 See, e.g., Vest v. Kramer, 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105 (1952); Kern v. Con-
tract Cartage Co., 55 Ohio Ct. App. 481, 9 N.E.2d 869, 875 (1936) (dictum).
50 See, e.g., Miller v. Berman, 55 Cal. App. 2d 569, 131 P.2d 18 (1942); Liberty
Highway Co. v. Callahan, 24 Ohio Ct. Ap. 174, 157 N.E. 708, 712 (1926); Hennessy v.
Walker, 279 N.Y. 94, 17 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1938).
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covered by a fire insurance policy on automobiles"' or an automobile lia-
bility policy." On the other hand, an accident policy covering mishaps
due to fire or vehicles was found to include damages caused by a bull-
dozer tractor knocking down a building." Also, an accident policy ex-
cluding motorcycles and aerial devices was considered to cover accidents
on a farm tractor.' An accident caused by a logging tractor was covered
by an accident policy excluding motorcycles and farm machinery." A
farm tractor was found subject to state sales taxes on motor vehicles,
"
and tractors were also held to be subject to motor vehicle fuel taxes.
"
It has been held that tractors are considered motor vehicles requiring
mufflers."
The most commonly accepted definition of a vehicle includes every
device except those moved by human power or used exclusively upon
stationary rails or tracks." Some statutes" prohibiting the driv;ng of
"any vehicle" while intoxicated expressly state that, for the purposes of
the statute defining certain vehicle offenses, persons riding bicycles"
or riding, or leading, or driving an animal" shall be subject to all pro-
visions applicable to the driver of a vehicle. The Colorado statute in-
cludes both bicyclists and drivers of animal-drawn vehicles." It is of
interest that some states, in which it is prohibited to drive "any motor ve-
hicle" while intoxicated, have expressly exempted farm tractors and some
other devices from their statutory definitions of motor vehicles."
Despite these variations in application and definition, very few
cases concerned with driving while intoxicated have been carried into
the appellate courts. Two cases where the main issue was the definition
of "motor vehicle" were appealed on the ground that steering a car
while being pushed or towed did not constitute operator of a motor
vehicle." Another case was appealed on the question of whether or not
a pickup truck was a motor vehicle as defined by the statute." However,
all three convictions were sustained by the higher courts.
It is axiomatic that criminal statutes are construed strictly. However,
decisions from many states have held that statutes prohibiting operation
of motor vehicles while intoxicated should be liberally construed so
51 Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952).
52 Bowers v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 166, 5 P.2d 608 (1931); Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1953); Brown v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
241 N.C. 666, 86 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1955).
3 Golding-Keene Co. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 96 N.H. 64, 69 A.2d 856, 859
(1949).
54 Koser v. American Cas. Co., 162 Pa. Super. 63, 56 A.2d 301 (1948).
55 Johnson v. Continental Cas. Co., 127 Mont. 281, 263 P.2d 551 (1953).
56 Burford-Toothaker Tractor Co. v. Curry, 241 Ala. 350, 2 So. 2d 420 (1941).
57 State v. Louisiana Oil Corp., 174 Miss. 585, 165 So. 423 (1936).
58 Johnson v. Bergquist, 184 Minn. 576, 239 N.W. 772 (1931).
59 E.g., Colo. 'Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (1) (1953). "Vehicle, every device in, upon or
by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public
highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon station-
ary rails Or tracks."
60 Boyd, An Analysis of the Drunken Driving Statutes in the United States, 8
Vand. L. Rev. 888, 892-93 (1955) is an excellent article which gives the wording of
each state's statute.
61 E.g., North Carolina.
62 E.g., Arizona, Georgia. and Oregon.
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-5 (1) (1953). "Every person riding a bicycle or driving
any animal drawing a vehicle upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of
this article applicable to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions of this article
which, by their nature, can have no application."
64 E.g., Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
65Chamberlain v. State, 294 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956); Rogers v. State,
147 Tex. Crim. 602, 183 S.W.2d 572 (1944).
66 Nichols v. State, 156 Tex. Crin. 364, 242 S.W.2d 396 (1951).
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that the public may be protected while on the highways.'7 It, is obvious
from the opinions in these and other cases that the judiciary intends to
protect the public as far as possible from the dangers of intoxicated
drivers.
What has Colorado done to protect the public from these hazards?
The Colorado statute appears to be as strict and inclusive as that of any
other state. Colorado statutes prohibit driving while intoxicated of
"any vehicle" upon the highways and "elsewhere through the state.""
The statutory definition of "vehicle" excludes only devices moved by
human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." Motor
vehicles include every self-propelled vehicle" with all types of tractors"
being specifically designated as motor vehicles. As mentioned before,
Colorado expressly includes bicyclists and drivers of animal-drawn ve-
hicles in the applicable sections."2
Indicative of what Colorado's stand probably would be in this mat-
ter is the decision handed down in an interesting case brought before
the Colorado Supreme Court several years ago. People v. Rapini," in-
volving an issue similar to the instant case, was concerned with a viola-
tion of the state statute prohibiting the use of vehicles with metal cleats
on state highways. The defendant alleged that the offending machine,
a binder, did not violate the statute since it was not a vehicle, but in-
stead was an "instrument of husbandry." The court granted that the
binder was an instrument of husbandry, but held that it was also a
vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
Should a case on all fours with Powell v. State be brought before the
Colorado courts, it is likely that a conviction for driving a vehicle while
intoxicated would be sustained. The plrosecLtion could rely upon the
statute as written with little difficulty.
67 See, e.g., State v. Mann, 143 lie. 305. 61 A.2d 786 (1948); People v. Rue, 166
Misc. 845, 2 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942 (City Ct. of Middletown 1938); Luellen v. State, 64 Okla.
Crim. 382, 81 P.2d 323 (1938).
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-30 (1) (Supp. 1955) (driving while intoxicated statute).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-1 (2) (1953). declares that the penalty sections, including those
for driving while intoxicated, apply upon the highways and elsewhere through the
state.
69 See note 59 supra.
70Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (2) (1953). "Motor vehicle, every vehicle, as herein
defined, which is self-propelled."
71 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-1 (6), (7) (1953).
72 See note 63 supra.





Mines and Minerals-Discovery-Scientific Discovery of
Uranium Ore
By GERALD STARBUCK
Gerald Starbuck received both his B.S. in Business Administration and his B.S. in
Engineering from the University of Colorado in 1953. Ha is a student at the
University of Denver College of Law.
On February 27, 1955, the defendants, while prospecting on state
land, detected with a geiger counter a radioactive count of four or five
times the normal background count. There was evidence that the de-
fendants obtained geiger counter readings at four points, posted four
notices, and dug four discovery pits. A sample was taken from one of the
pits and a chemical assay disclosed 1.24 percent uranium and 0.4 percent
vanadium. On April 4, 1955, the plaintiffs secured from the State Board
of Land Commissioners a mining lease to a half section of land which
included the defendant's four claims. In an ejectment action brought
by the plaintiffs, the defendants claimed a portion of the land by alleging
valid prior lode mining locations under state law.' In the trial court the
issue narrowed down to the validity of the initial discovery and a
judgment was entered for the defendants. The Colorado Supreme Court,
affirming the trial court, held that, when the controversy is between two
mineral claimants, the statutes requiring discovery should be liberally
construed. The court further held that where, as in a group of con-
tiguous claims lying in similar ground, competent radiometric readings
coupled with an assay disclose mineral in place on at least one of the
claims, similar radiometric findings on the other claims would consti-
tute valid discoveries within the meaning of the statute if such other
discoveries are "capable of competent radiometric delineation in similar
rock in place or along the same vein or lode."' A dissenting opinion felt
the decision was revolutionary in the field of mineral law and pointed
out that geiger counters could not distinguish between mineralized rock
in place and mineralized rock in float or wash. Dallas v. Fitzsimmons,
323 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1958).
Prior to this Colorado decision two other state supreme courts had
faced the question of the validity of discoveries made with geiger coun-
ters or scintillators and a split of authority had evolved.
In a 1958 Utah case the defendant offered evidence that ore bodies
had been found in strata on both sides of his claims and that one of
these ore bodies was supporting a producing mine.' He also showed
that certain channeling of a type along which uranium is often found
ran through his claims and on these claims favorable geiger counter
readings had been obtained. The court upheld the claims and stated
that it was perfectly legitimate to rely on radiometric indications as one
of the means for locating uranium. It further stated that, in testing the
validity of a discovery, consideration may be given not only to the min-
eral found, but also to the geology of the area, the locations of other ore
bodies or mines in the area, the opinions of experts, and any other infor-
mation which miners regard as having an influence upon the possibility
' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 112-3-42 (1953).
2 Dallas v. Fitzsimmons, 323 P.2d 274, 279 (Colo. 1958).
3 Rummel v. Bailey, 320 P.2d 653 (Utah 1958).
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of developing a mine, and in the case of uranium, the geiger counter
may be considered.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in 1957 was faced with a fact situa-
tion similar to that of the main case." In the Wyoming case, the plaintiff
staked ten adjoining claims in an area showing radiometric readings
of two to seven times the normal background count. From three of these
claims samples were taken from rock in place and assays of these samples
showed the presence of uranium. The defendants subsequently staked
claims on the same ground. The court recited that to establish a valid
location of a mining claim there must be a discovery of valuable mineral
in a lead, lode, ledge, vein, or rock in place. It stated that on seven of the
claims there had been no sampling or assaying and therefore no discov-
ery of mineral in place. The court refused to recognize the readings of
scintillators or geiger counters as sufficient to support discovery stating
that such readings could not be depended upon as the only test, for in
some areas these instruments would give indications of a high back-
ground count yet assay would show no uranium. Judgment allowed the
plaintiff only the three claims which had been sampled and assayed:
In a recent Colorado case involving uranium mining claims, the
validity of discovery was not an issue, but the Colorado Supreme Court
discussed at some length the problems facing the courts in attempting to
apply mining laws developed years ago to modern controversies over
lands containing uranium ore.' There it was explained that one of the
most successful ways of discovering secondary uranium ore bodies where
no outcrops are visible is with the use of radio detecting instruments.
It was pointed out that uranium ore bodies are often subject to thick
layers of overburden and that, although radiometric readings above the
normal may be -found on the surface, yet no single piece of rock picked
up from the surface will react or give a count. This phenomenon has re-
sulted in the practice among prospectors of staking claims over a large
area when a radiometric anomaly is found. Notices are posted and lo-
cation certificates filed with the hope of establishing subsequent legal
discoveries to validate the claims before intervening rights have arisen.
The court recognized that no legislation had been enacted expressly
providing for valid discoveries by radio detection and this was attributed
to fear of inoperative or defective instruments,' mistakes, and the fact that
radioactive ore bodies are far from consistent in their response to the va-
rious instruments. Some deposits of uranium are in balance and either
do not give a count or give one entirely different from that to be ex-
pected when compared to assayed samples taken from the same area.
The court terminated this discussion by stating that chemical assay was
the conclusive test.
The problem of defining the requirements for discovery is by no
means a new one. The general rule, which evolved from the early mining
days, is that, where minerals have been found and the evidence is of such
4 Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 318 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1957).
5 Smaller v. Leach, 316 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1957) (dictum). See also Waldeck, Dis-
covery Requirements and Rights Prior to Discovery on Uranium Claims on the Colo-
rado Plateau, 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 404 (1955); Note, 4 Utah L. Rev. 239 (1954).
6 Note, 9 Wyo. L. J. 214 (1955).
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character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the
further expenditure of his labor and means, the requirements of the
statute have been met.'
In 1865, the manner of locating lode claims in Colorado was gov-
erned by the rules and customs of the miners and they all recognized
discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation to the discov-
erer's title.8 However, the enactment of the statutes requiring the dis-
coverer to sink a discovery shaft upon the lode to show a well defined
crevice within sixty days from initial discovery tended to reduce the im-
portance of initial discovery.' This was evidenced in a decision which
held that the mere discovery of some other vein within the limits of the
claim would not supply the requirement of the discovery to be exposed
in the discovery shaft." Initial discovery coupled with notice properly
made and posted became an appropriation of the claim for a period of
sixty days." During that time a discovery shaft was to be dug and the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the shaft must show a well defined
crevice containing mineral bearing rock in place." This rule of discovery
has been somewhat more restrictive than the general rule as construed
by the federal courts and states not requiring discovery shafts."
In 1955, legislation was enacted in Colorado enabling claim locators
to submit a map prepared in a prescribed manner in lieu of sinking
the discovery shaft." Thus, today, if a locator elects to submit the map
instead of digging a discovery shaft, the validity of his initial discovery
becomes of primary importance in establishing his rights within the
statute. It is of interest to note that in Dallas v. Fitzsimmons the court
cited federal authority in defining the requirements for initial dis-
covery," indicating possible attachment to the general rule.
Dallas v. Fitzsimmons represents a forward step in reconciling mod-
ern prospecting and locating practices to the requirements of the law.
By requiring at least one assay to substantiate radiometric discoveries
on a number of adjacent lode claims, the Colorado Supreme Court has
insured against many of the shortcomings of radio detecting instruments
and the unpredictable physical characteristics of uranium ore deposits,
and at the same time has given locators more latitude in establishing
enough claims to warrant a mining operation. On the other hand, prob-
lems still exist where the deposit lies beneath several hundred feet of
overburden and the obtaining of a sample for assay is a difficult and ex-
pensive matter. However, the decision appears to be a reasonable one
enhancing the probability of development of public lands and offering
protection to the rights of bona fide locators of uranium deposits.
Crisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905); Pitcher v. Jones, 71 Utah 453, 267 Pac. 184
(1928).
s Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527 (1885); Consolidated Republic Min. Co. v. Lebanon
Min. Co., 9 Colo. 343, 12 Pac. 212 (1886).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 92-22-6, 92-22-9 (1953).
10 Beals v. Cone, 27 Colo. 473, 62 Pac. 948 (1900).
11 Sierra Blanca Mining and Reduction Co. v. Winchell, 35 Colo. 13, 83 Pac. 628
(1905).
12 Bryan c. McCaig, 10 Colo. 309, 15. Pac. 413 (1887).
13 See note 8 supra.
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 92-22-6 (Supp. 1955).
15 Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co., 98 Fed. 673 (1899).
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Securities-Securities Act of 1933-Purchaser of Securities
As Underwriter
By LEON A. ALLEN, JR.
Leon A. Allen Jr. received the degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from
Cornell University in 1955. He is presently a student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
A corporation engaged in the publication of books and magazines
sold $4,000,000 principal amount of ten-yea- convertible debentures
without registering under the Securities Act of 1933 either the debentures
or the common stock into which they were immediately convertible.
The selling corporation acted in reliance upon exemptions from regis-
tration claimed under section 4 (1) of the Securities Act of 1933 as "trans-
actions by an issuer not involving any public offering."' Twenty-seven
purchasers, including four broker-dealer firms, were contacted privately
through the corporation's underwriter and subscribed to over $3,000,000
of the issue. These purchasers signed and submitted to the selling cor-
poration an investment letter representing that the debentures were pur-
chased for investment with no intention of distribution.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, after an investigation,
stated that the issue did involve a public offering and that no exemption
existedti under section 4 (1). The Commission maintained that the in-
vestment letter was signed by persons having no clear understanding of
its meaning and did not protect the issuer. Since the original purchaser
had acquired the debentures in order to convert them into common stock
which was then distributed to the public, the Commission held that
these purchasers were to be considered underwriters and registration by
the issuer was necessary. It was additionally stated that holding for the
six months' capital gains period of the tax statutes, holding in an "in-
vestment account" rather than a "trading account," holding for a de-
ferred sale, holding for a market rise, holding for sale if the market does
not rise, or holding for a year, does not afford a statutory basis for ex-
emption and should not be relied upon in issuing securities. The cor-
poration then submitted a registration statement which the Commission
accepted. Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, SEC, Securities Act of
1933 Release No. 3825 (1957).
1 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1952).
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Shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, congres-
sional and administrative study evolved some early interpretations of the
statutory definition of an underwriter.' The House of Representatives
committee studying the matter had this to say about the definition:
"The term is defined broadly enough to include not only
the ordinary underwriter who for a commission promises to see
than an issue is disposed of at a certain price, but also includes
as an underwriter the person who purchases an issue outright
with the idea of then selling that issue to the public."'
The theory upon which future decisions would be based was out-
lined by the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in 19352 His opinion maintained that if the original purchaser had
purchased with the intent of distributing the securities, he would be an
underwriter and sales by a dealer of securities bought by him from the
initial purchaser would generally not be exempt until at least a year
after the purchase of the securities by the dealer. He also noted that
the size and manner of the offering should be considered. It has been
judicially affirmed that the burden of the proof of exemption falls upon
the party claiming the exemption.'
The first important administrative decision on this interpretation
held that the president of a corporation who received securities from the
2 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1952).
3 H.R. Comm. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1934).
4 Securities Act Release No. 285 (1935).
5 SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 193).
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corporation and resold in appreciable volume to the public was an under-
writer, even though he received no price differential and was not treated
differently from the other stockholders.' In a subsequent ruling the
Commission held that a firm was an underwriter where it had loaned
money to an individual to enable him to exercise an option to buy the
issuer's stock and the firm was to share in the profits and risks of the
undertaking. The general question was considered of sufficient impor-
tance for the Commission to issue a release interpreting the definition to
exclude persons who purchase for investment unsold securities at a dis-
count from the original underwriters.8 The opinion considered the in-
tention of the purchaser at the time of purchase the crucial point and
held that this intention was a question of fact. For example, if the pur-
chaser was a professional securities broker, the inference might be that
the securities were purchased with a view towards distributing them.
This rule was later applied by the Commission in holding that changed
circumstances could permit resale without the seller being classed as
an underwriter.!
A further expansion of the definition occurred in 1941 when a
court of appeals held, in reversing a district court, that there did not
have to be a fiduciary or other contractual relationship between the
issuer and underwriter." A Chinese benevolent association gratuitously
promoting and assisting in the sale of bonds of the Republic of China
was thus held to be an underwriter. The Commission received added
support for its position when the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co." that the Commission was under no duty to use any specific
numerical test in determining whether a public offering existed. Al-
though the court did not consider the position of the purchaser, it may
be inferred that it would similarly support the Commission's refusal to
delineate specific requirements for an underwriter.
In its latest decision the Commission categorically denies that any
of the usual tests as to the private offering purchaser can be used to com-
pletely exclude him from being labeled an underwriter. The invest-
ment letter and the holding of securities for a year had previously been
6 Kinner Airplane and Motor Corp., 2 S.E.C. 943 (1937).
7 Sweet's Steel Co., 4 S.E.C. 689 (1939).
s Securities Act Release No. 1862 (1938).
9 Comstock-Dexter Mines, Inc., 10 S.E.C. 358 (1941).
10 SEC v. Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941).
11 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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relied upon as a fairly reliable protection against the terms of the statute.
It is now evident that the Commission will not permit these safeguards
to be used as a positive defense." This is the first case to specifically hold
purchasers with no relationship to the issuer beyond the fact of purchase
as underwriters, although the possibility had always been present.
In the future, therefore, it will certainly continue to become more
difficult for an issuer to take advantage of exemptions within the
Securities Act. The Commission has been consistently upheld by the
Courts in its refusal to specify positive requirements for exemptions, and
it thus remains free to act in any case where it may feel that action is
necessary. This means that it will be very difficult for the issuer to de-
termine if he may qualify under an exemption from the act. The ex-
tensive reliance on investment letters in the past may prompt issuers in
the future to revise the form of the letter to inform purchasers of the
Commission's interpretation of purchasing for distribution. Whether a
disclosure of this nature to initial purchasers will satisfy the Commis-
sion's requirements remains to be seen. If this form of letter is rejected
by the Commission, the difficulty of sustaining the burden of proof
that the securities have been acquired by initial purchasers for invest-
ment only, in the face of a possible subsequent resale, places a treacherous
obstacle in the path of the issuer. Counsel for the issuer must either
recommend that the securities be registered in all borderline cases, or lie
will be forced to sustain a very difficult proof of exemption in case the
Commission decides to act.
12 The Commission reiterated this positicn in suspension actions against three of
the broker-dealer firms involved in the Crowell-Collier issue. Securities Exchange Act
Releases No. 5688, 5689, 5690 (May 7, 1958).
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